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of Brunner's interesting theory that the *sectatores* were originally simply witnesses to the complaint, and that their coöperation was required to make out a *prima facie* case and to serve as a bar to frivolous litigation.

How accurate or inaccurate the author's citations from other books may be I have not undertaken to determine. I have examined only some of his references to Brunner.

MUNROE SMITH.

State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada.

Edited by J. K. LAUGHTON for the Navy Records Society. Printed for the Society, London, 1894.—Two vols., 365, 418 pp.

About ten years since, a well-known Spanish naval officer, Captain Duro, published, in a work called *La Armada Invencible*, an immense number of Spanish documents relating to the invasion of England in 1588. Now an English naval officer, Professor Laughton of King's College, London, has edited, in two handsome, well-printed volumes, all the important English documents relating to the strictly naval aspect of this invasion. The editor has prefaced his collection of state papers by an introduction (74 pages) in which he gives the conclusions to which his researches have led.

For the narrower and purely naval aspect of the Armada we now have ample materials in the publications of Duro and Laughton. And it was fitting that the latter, editing for a Navy Records Society, should devote himself, not only in the choice of documents, but in the introduction, almost exclusively to this aspect. On the other hand, it is for the same reason strange that the editor deems it "unnecessary here to describe the fights of that eventful week" (page lii). For it is certainly possible, by a careful and critical comparison of the authentic English and Spanish evidence now before us, to give step by step a fairly accurate account and explanation of the channel fights. And it is desirable, at this time of special interest in the influence of sea power upon history, to know exactly what happened in those summer days of the year 1588, when the English sailors turned the history of the world towards a new and happier goal.

Professor Laughton gives several very interesting pages (xliv ff.) to a comparison of the English and Spanish guns. Unfortunately the data are not adequate to his purpose. We have an official description of the guns of only two Spanish ships. The armaments of the others (table, page xlv) are taken from a Spanish document dated July 9, 1587, compared in the case of the *San Lorenzo* with the somewhat loose report of an Englishman who boarded her off

Calais. On account of its date, the Spanish document proves nothing in regard to the armaments in the channel fights. It is known, for example, that on March 14, 1588, Philip ordered the armaments to be strengthened. The document, indeed, differs decidedly from the official inventory taken at Lisbon (May, 1588).

The statement (page xliv) that the Spanish guns were "as a rule . . . small — 4, 6 or 9-pounders" seems to be based largely on the fact that Medina Sidonia, August 5, 1588, sent a messenger to Parma asking for balls of 4, 6 and 10 pounds. The conclusion is rather hasty. The smaller guns could naturally be fired more easily and quickly; the balls assigned to them may thus have been sooner used up.

We have no exact information about the armament of the English ships. The figures given in Professor Laughton's tables are taken from papers dated 1586, 1595, 1595-99. The unsatisfactory nature of the evidence is illustrated by the fact that in respect to each of the three ships *Tiger*, *Rainbow* and *Vanguard* the armament in 1586 differs very widely from that in 1595-99.

Perhaps we can arrive at a fairer appreciation than Professor Laughton's of the relative strength of the Spanish and English armaments by comparing the ships which, according to the Spanish and English documents, bore the brunt of battle in the channel. The armaments of the English ships must unfortunately be taken from the unsatisfactory list of 1595-99. On the next page the principal facts are presented in tabular form.

According to this evidence no English ship had more guns than *Victory*, 46. Of the twenty-two Spanish ships eight had more than this, with a maximum of 52. The armament of *San Lorenzo*, to which Professor Laughton's table assigns a broadside of 330 pounds, was probably little heavier than that of the other three galleasses; seven of the squadron of twenty-two probably had an armament superior or similar to *N. S. d. Rosario*, to which Professor Laughton assigns a broadside of 200 pounds; seven an armament ranging between *N. S. d. Rosario* and *San Salvador*, to which Professor Laughton assigns a broadside of 185 pounds. This leaves only four equal or inferior to *San Salvador*. Moreover, the light armament assigned in Professor Laughton's tables to *Anunciada* and *Sta. Maria* has no authority except the unreliable document of July 9, 1587.

Of the English squadron of fifteen none could deliver a broadside materially heavier than the Spanish *San Lorenzo*, and only three a broadside as heavy, so that the four galleasses and these three ships

SPANISH FLEET.

SHIPS' NAMES.	TONS.	NUMBER OF GUNS.
S. Juan de Portugal	1050	50
Rata	820	35
San Mateo	750	34
San Felipe	800	40
San Martin	1000	48
Gran Grin	1160	28
Regazona	1249	30
Santa Ana (Oquendo)	1200	47
San Marcos	790	33
San Xpobal	700	36
San Juan (D. Flores)	530	24
S. Juan d. Sicilia	800	26
Veneciana Valencera	1100	42
Begoña	750	24
S. Luis	830	38
Gal. Florencia	961	52
Santiago	520	24
Juan Bautista	750	24
Each of four Galeasses	50

ENGLISH FLEET.

SHIPS' NAMES.	TONS.	GUNS, 6-POUNDERS AND OVER.	GUNS SMALLER THAN 6-POUNDERS	TOTAL OF GUNS.	APPROXI- MATE WEIGHT OF BROADSIDE.
Revenge	500
Victory	800	39	7	46	216
Ark	800	38	6	44	324
Golden Lion	500	35	9	44	222
Nonpareil	500	32	8	40	222
Mary Rose	600	29	3	32	216
White Bear	1000	31	9	40	336
Eliz. Jonas	900	35	9	44	292
Rainbow	500	26	26	232
Vanguard	500	31	31	241
Eliz. Bonaventure	600	33	6	39	246
Dreadnought	400	27	6	33	157
Swallow	360
Hope	600	30	6	36	244
Triumph	1100	38	6	44	336

probably had similar armaments. Ten others of the fifteen English ships were similar or superior to *N. S. d. Rosario* in weight of broadside. These would correspond to the seven Spanish ships mentioned above. The two remaining English ships were inferior in weight of broadside to *San Salvador*, whereas the Spaniards had seven ranging between *N. S. d. Rosario* and *San Salvador*. The mere superiority in the number of important ships of course greatly raised the number of Spanish guns.

The Spanish squadron of twenty-two carried an average of 38 guns of all sorts; the English squadron of thirteen,¹ an average of $32\frac{8}{13}$ guns firing a ball of 6 pounds and over, and $38\frac{5}{13}$ guns of all sorts. The average numbers of guns of all sorts, therefore, were almost equal; while, looking only at the ships which did the hardest fighting and practically decided the contest, the Spaniards had absolutely very many more guns than the English. Our data further indicate that the armaments of many of the twenty-two Spanish ships compared not unfavorably in weight with those of the English squadron of fifteen.

In all this it must, however, be remembered that our evidence is unsatisfactory. The above discussion is meant simply to show this, and to modify the somewhat misleading statement that the Spanish guns were neither "numerous" nor large, but "as a rule . . . 4, 6 or 9-pounders."

From the mass of valuable things in the book I should single out for special mention the "Relation of Proceedings" (I, p. 1) and the proof of its authenticity (II, 338); the explosion (p. lxxvii) of the story of David Gwynn, which Motley tells with such enthusiasm; the discussion (p. lvii) of the causes of the illness in the English fleet, Professor Laughton concluding, in opposition to Froude, that it was not due to sour beer and putrid beef, and that the queen did not deliberately starve the seamen; lastly, the origin of Palavicino's proposal to Parma (II, 198).

Professor Laughton is to be congratulated upon having made an invaluable contribution to history. His book is a graceful and peculiarly fitting monument to the glory of a reign that made England mistress of the seas.

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¹ Omitting *Revenge* and *Swallow*. The latter would have lowered the average.